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Letter dated 16 January 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the two attached communications, dated 22 and 30 December 2016, respectively, which I received from Ahmet Üzümcü, Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (see annexes I and II).

The letter of 22 December 2016 transmits the report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the incident of 2 August 2016, as reported in the note verbale of the Syrian Arab Republic number 69, dated 16 August 2016.

The letter of 30 December 2016 transmits a summary update of the activities carried out by the Fact-Finding Mission in 2016.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annexes to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-00722 (E) 190117

Please recycle

Annex I

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my report entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of 2 August 2016 as reported in the note verbale of the Syrian Arab Republic number 69, dated 16 August 2016" (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

OPCW **Technical Secretariat**

S/1444/2016
21 December 2016
Original: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

REPORT OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA REGARDING THE INCIDENT OF 2 AUGUST 2016 AS REPORTED IN THE NOTE VERBALE OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC NUMBER 69 DATED 16 AUGUST 2016

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 At its Forty-Eighth Meeting, the OPCW Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) in which, inter alia, it requested the Director-General to provide information on the progress of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and specific plans, schedules, and their implementation to the Council at its next regular session. In response to that request, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") submitted a Note to address the future activities of the FFM (S/1255/2015*, dated 10 March 2015 and Add.1, dated 13 March 2015).

1.2 The Secretariat received Note Verbale 69 (dated 16 August 2016) from the Syrian Arab Republic, providing information about an incident in Al-Awamid, Aleppo, involving the alleged use of chemicals as a weapon. The note verbale included a request that the FFM "investigate a toxic gas attack which took place in Aleppo on August the 2nd, 2016".

1.3 Following this request, the Director-General dispatched a team to collect the facts pertinent to the alleged chemical incident as reported in the aforementioned note verbale. The FFM deployed on 4 September and 11 October 2016. The team was composed of OPCW inspectors and interpreters. During the deployment, the FFM conducted its investigation by collecting testimonies, reviewing documents and information provided by the Syrian authorities, and by visiting certain locations deemed of interest in the Damascus area. In total, the team conducted 25 interviews in relation to the reported incident.

1.4 Regarding the aforementioned alleged incident in Al-Awamid, the FFM is of the view that the persons affected in the incident may have, in some instances, been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating substance. The FFM considers that while the general clinical presentation of those affected in the incident is consistent with brief exposure to any number of chemicals or environmental insults, the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritant does not clearly indicate any specific chemical.

1.5 Furthermore, based on the evidence presented by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic, the medical records that were reviewed, the results of the sample analyses, and the prevailing narrative from all of the interviews, the FFM cannot confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical was used as a weapon in the investigated incident. From the results of the analyses of the samples, the FFM is of the opinion that none of the chemicals identified are likely to be the cause of death of the casualties in the reported incident.

2. FACT-FINDING MISSION BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1 The Secretariat received Note Verbale 69 (dated 16 August 2016) from the Syrian Arab Republic requesting the OPCW to investigate a toxic gas attack that took place in Aleppo on 2 August 2016.

2.2 Contained in this note verbale was Letter No. 122 (dated 15 August 2016), which provided information regarding an incident that occurred in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo on 2 August 2016. The information in this letter described an incident in which six people were killed and a further 20 people were injured when projectiles containing toxic gas were used. The note verbale further indicated that the casualties were transferred to the Zahi Azraq Hospital, Aleppo, where they were treated with oxygen, intravenous fluids, and antibiotics. The casualties were complaining of immediate burns in the face and eyes, with severe headaches and general lethargy, dryness of the mouth, and loss of consciousness. On arrival at the hospital, it appears that some of the casualties were agitated and exhibiting signs of a clouded consciousness. A number of laboratory analyses, including acetylcholinesterase analysis, were conducted. According to the letter, acetylcholinesterase levels were within normal range, and the possibility of Sarin was excluded. However, it was concluded that, due to the neurological symptoms, the likely agent was mustard, though a differential diagnosis could not exclude carbon monoxide or chlorine.

2.3 Letter No. 122 contained a request by the Syrian Arab Republic that the FFM should be tasked with looking into the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in order to investigate the described incident.

2.4 Letter No. 122 also contained the minutes of a meeting of a committee established by the Health Directorate to look into the described incident, a report from the Zahi Azraq Hospital (dated 4 August 2016), and an autopsy report issued by the Forensic Medicine Centre in the Aleppo Directorate.

2.5 The minutes of the meeting described the actions of the staff at the hospital and further details regarding areas that could improve the hospital's response to any future incidents.

2.6 The medical report listed the 20 casualties who were admitted to the emergency department of the Zahi Azraq Hospital on 2 August 2016. The report described a diverse range of symptoms that were exhibited by the casualties, as well as the treatment that was given. The report indicated that, though unconfirmed, the likely agent was mustard, with a differential diagnosis of carbon monoxide or chlorine. All of the admitted patients were discharged from the hospital in good health on the morning of 3 August 2016.

2.7 The autopsy report provided a description of one of the fatalities with a list of toxicological signs. It stated the cause of death as heart and respiratory failure, caused by an inhalation of a toxic gaseous substance.

3. INITIAL DEPLOYMENT

3.1 The initial deployment was comprised of the mission team leader and three team members who carried out preparatory activities from 4 to 9 September 2016. This team conducted several meetings with the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic to discuss details of a follow-on deployment, and gathered information associated with the incident that the National Authority provided. This included medical records of casualties, names of individuals affected, and hospital staff.

3.2 Additionally, the team was allowed access to the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in Barzi to inspect samples that were collected by the National Authority, and the team was able to take and secure splits of these samples for further analysis by the OPCW at a designated laboratory. A full list of collected documents and samples can be found in Annexes 2, 3, 5, and 8 to this report.

3.3 The composition of the team deployed from 4 to 9 September 2016 was as follows:

Advance team of the Fact-Finding Mission

No.	Function	Speciality
1.	Team Leader	Inspection Team Leader
2.	Confidentiality Officer	Analytical Chemist Inspector
3.	Logistics Officer	Chemical Weapons Munitions Specialist
4.	Interpreter	N/A

3.4 The advance team returned to OPCW Headquarters and commenced preparations for the second deployment, which included the development of the mandate, equipment and interview kit preparation, and other routine logistic and operational planning.

4. SECOND DEPLOYMENT

4.1 The second deployment was comprised of the Inspection Team Leader, Deputy Team Leader, three subteam members, and two interpreters; the team deployed from 11 to 20 October 2016.

Main composition of the Fact-Finding Mission

No.	Function	Speciality
1.	Team Leader	Inspection Team Leader
2.	Deputy Team Leader	Chemical Weapons Munition Specialist Inspector
3.	Interview subteam member	Analytical Chemist Inspector
4.	Interview subteam member	Analytical Chemist Inspector
5.	Interview subteam member	Advance Health and Safety Specialist Inspector
6.	Interpreter	N/A
7.	Interpreter	N/A

4.2 Upon arrival, the team met with the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic to hand over the mandate and discuss the mission plan for the coming days. This included notification of those to be interviewed, scheduled times for movements to the SSRC in Barzi to repackage and take custody of the previously secured samples, and the development of the investigative steps moving forward.

4.3 Over the course of the deployment, the team conducted 25 interviews with various individuals involved in the full scope of the incident. These individuals were chosen based on their qualifications and relationship to the incident, based on information provided by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic during the first deployment. They included casualties, medical treatment personnel, National Authority representatives who retrieved samples from the hospital and incident site, as well as SSRC personnel who conducted the initial analysis of the collected samples. A list of those interviewed can be found in paragraph 4.4 below and Annex 3 to this report.

4.4 List of interviews conducted between 12 and 19 October 2016

List of Interviewees			
DCN	**Profession**	**DCN**	**Profession**
10000	Soldier	10038	Civil Defence member
10001	Civil Defence member	10043	Resident doctor
10002	Firefighter	10045	Nurse
10003	Firefighter	10046	Civil Defence member
10004	Soldier	10047	Doctor, toxicologist
10005	Civil Defence member	10048	Emergency department doctor
10006	Firefighter	10049	Nurse
10013	Lab staff	10051	Internal medicine doctor
10032	Firefighter	10052	Firefighter
10034	Firefighter	10041	Chemist
10035	Firefighter	10040	Senior officer, Syrian Arab Army
10036	Firefighter	10044	Senior staff member, SSRC
10037	Senior firefighter		

4.5 The FFM was provided with additional documentation, including X-rays and photographs, for this reported incident (see Annex 2 to this report).

4.6 The data analysis and methodology for interviews employed by the FFM was consistent with OPCW standard operating procedures and is further discussed in Section 5 of this report.

5. DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis methodology employed by the Fact-Finding Mission

5.1 The FFM inspectors conducted an analysis of the alleged incident, with a focus on identifying aspects related to the use of chemicals as a weapon. The analysis methodology used by the team to evaluate interviews and documents provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic is described in this report in paragraphs 5.4 to 5.7 under "Interview Analysis Methodology" and paragraph 5.37 under "Analysis of Information Provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the Form of Documents and Services".

5.2 The analysis of the medical information provided to the FFM in the form of records, services, and testimonies collected by the team was carried out by the medical personnel within the FFM.

5.3 Both of the analyses specified in paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 were taken into account in fulfilling the FFM's mandate.

Interview analysis methodology

5.4 The interview analysis methodology employed by the FFM allowed individual accounts to be collated into a prevailing narrative, where factual content could be extracted and reported according to the mandate. The various steps of this methodology are described in the paragraphs below.

5.5 First, the audio and video records of each interview conducted by the team were translated and transcribed into English by qualified interpreters in order to facilitate their thorough analysis.

5.6 Then, the verbal content of each interview (the video, audio, and transcripts thereof) was carefully reviewed by at least two FFM inspectors. In order to organise the individual responses, a timeline-based analysis table was produced. This allowed each respondent's description of locations, sights, sounds, smells, and actions to be categorised according to relevant variables. During the interview review process, the FFM inspectors matched the interviewees' responses with their respective variables in the analysis table. The result for each interview was a unique description of the evolving, sequential event, from the perspective of that individual interviewee. Once all relevant narratives had been individually assembled, they were compared against one another to identify commonalities and discrepancies.

5.7 Commonalities formed the basis of the prevailing narrative, and discrepancies were analysed to determine their significance. Given that some of the interviewees were themselves casualties and that there were significant ongoing combat operations in the area, the FFM anticipated reasonable discrepancies in the events recalled from respondents. In cases where discrepancies were minor or of little consequence to establishing a prevailing narrative (i.e., the recollection of general timings and distances), they were disregarded. In cases where

discrepancies were more significant or starkly deviated from the prevailing narrative, they were noted and assessed further in the context of other evidence to see if they could be reconciled. If reconciliation with the prevailing narrative was not possible, the discrepant narrative could be considered limited in value and therefore difficult to objectively address the FFM's mandate aims.

5.8 The information and services provided to the FFM by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic are listed in this report under Annexes 2 and 5. The FFM reviewed the information provided in order to gather facts regarding the incident involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals.

Analysis of the incident in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo on 2 August 2016

5.9 The prevailing narrative established by a review of all of the interviews relating to this reported incident is as follows:

(a) The information provided by the testimonies of those interviewed is that some form of combat operation was ongoing in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo (Al-Hamam Point in the Al-Aqaba area). Soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army (SAAR) were engaged in a battle, which reportedly had begun two to three days before 2 August 2016, with members of an armed opposition group.

(b) Between 16:00 and 17:00 on 1 August 2016, SAAR soldiers were alerted to the presence of a tunnel, which was approximately 25 metres long and 7 metres deep. The armed opposition group attempted to blow up the tunnel, but it appears that only a small section collapsed.

(c) At 21:00 on 1 August 2016, SAAR soldiers were ordered to destroy the remaining sections of the tunnel, as it could still be used by armed opposition groups. SAAR soldiers dug several metres into the tunnel in order to set the explosive charges. They used six explosive cylinders which had been seized from armed opposition groups, or unexploded devices which had been fired at SAAR positions. These cylinders had been described as "hell cannons" or mortars, which comprised a gas cylinder (approximately 25 kg in weight and 1 metre in length) with a detonator.

(d) Prior to the initiation of the main charges by the SAAR, soldiers were dispatched to inspect a portion of the tunnel. It appears that the soldiers were able to enter and return from this inspection with no ill effects. The SAAR detonated the main charges at approximately 4:00 on 2 August 2016.

(e) The SAAR waited until between 11:30 and 12:00 on 2 August 2016 before sending two soldiers into the tunnel to ensure that the desired effect had been achieved and that the tunnel could no longer be used by armed opposition group forces. It appears that the soldiers entered the tunnel without any respiratory protection and did not return to

the surface when called. While these soldiers were in the tunnel, another soldier, stationed in the area near the opening of the tunnel, described a strange, strong odour coming up from the tunnel.

(f) A decision was made to send an additional two soldiers with masks and canisters into the tunnel, and these soldiers also did not reply to calls. A total of four soldiers were now down in the tunnel and not responding to calls.

(g) Rescue operations then commenced with the assistance of the Syrian Civil Defence and firefighters. The first person from the Civil Defence entered the tunnel equipped with a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and two ropes to assist in bringing the victims out. Within one minute of entering the tunnel, both ropes went slack and there was no response to verbal calls. There were now five individuals in the tunnel.

(h) Firefighters then arrived and were briefed on the ongoing situation. A firefighter entered the tunnel equipped with an SCBA and two ropes to attempt a rescue. A minute to a minute and a half after entering the tunnel, this firefighter failed to respond to verbal calls and both ropes appeared to be unattached. There were now six individuals in the tunnel.

(i) It is assessed that these individuals were unconscious at that point, and were presumed to have become fatalities. When they entered into the tunnel, the first two victims had no respiratory protection, the second two wore facemasks and canisters, and the last two were equipped with SCBAs, the cylinders of which were reportedly filled with oxygen.

(j) At this point of the operation, four oxygen cylinders were lowered into the tunnel one at a time, in an attempt to increase oxygen levels. Water was also sprayed into the mouth of the tunnel.

(k) Between 15:30 and 16:00, a third rescuer, a member of the Civil Defence, entered the tunnel again equipped with an SCBA and two ropes. While being lowered into the tunnel, he complained of dizziness and tightness in his chest, and was then pulled out. After a short rest, he was again lowered into the tunnel. When he reached the bottom of the tunnel, he indicated to be taken out of the tunnel. Upon extraction, he reported there was no strength in his hands; he was given water and then collapsed. Afterwards, he was transported to Al-Razi Hospital for treatment.

(l) A fourth rescuer, a member of the Civil Defence, entered the tunnel, again equipped with an SCBA and two ropes. He attached the rope to a victim; he was then extracted, followed by the victim. This victim was still wearing his SCBA and appeared to be unresponsive.

(m) A firefighter, who was part of a rescue team but did not enter into the tunnel, began performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, while another firefighter attempted chest compressions on a rescued victim. One of these firefighters started to feel tightness in his chest and developed a headache, and dizziness. It was reported that "a strange smell was coming off the casualty, and a heat was radiating out of him". The rescuer who was performing the resuscitation touched his own face with his hands (which had been holding the casualty) and his face and hands started to burn and itch.

(n) The fourth rescuer, who was involved in the retrieval of four casualties from the tunnel, reports that he collapsed, short of breath, and his verbal response was not normal. He was sent to the Al-Razi Hospital for further treatment.

(o) A fifth rescuer, a firefighter, entered the tunnel and attached the rope to the fifth casualty, who was reported to have been wearing a face mask with a filter. This firefighter repeated the same process for the sixth casualty; as he was tying up the last casualty, he started to get a headache and experienced shortness of breath. This rescuer then collapsed while walking to the ladder at the base of the tunnel, and he too was retrieved by the attached rope and sent to the Al-Razi Hospital.

(p) None of those interviewed could describe the smell, except to say that it was a strange, weird, or strong smell that they had never experienced before and could not identify. The smell increased closer to the entrance of the tunnel and when the oxygen cylinders were lowered into the tunnel. A particularly strong smell came off the bodies of the casualties when they were retrieved from the tunnel. It was not a gunpowder or explosive smell that any of the interview participants had experienced before.

(q) Throughout the whole incident, there was ongoing intense fighting, including with a number of mortars and projectiles landing in close proximity to the tunnel. This fighting hindered and prolonged the rescue operation.

(r) Many of the interviewees had difficulty identifying the exact incident location on a map. However, there was consistency in that the interviewees could identify local landmarks, which were corroborated by the Syrian Arab Republic National Authority's reporting of the GPS coordinates of the incident location.

(s) As previously described, captured enemy "hell cannon mortars" were used to assist in demolishing the tunnel. The actual content of these munitions is unknown.

Discrepancies

5.10 Some soldiers stated they could smell the odour with face masks/filters on, while others could not smell anything.

5.11 The exact timeline of the incident is not entirely clear. It was reported that there was a "fierce battle raging" for several days with intense shelling of the area. What is clear is that, at some point, the tunnel was discovered and an attempt was made to destroy it. There is no clear indication of what was in or around the tunnel prior to the attempt to destroy it.

Hospital phase of the alleged event

5.12 Between 16:00 and 16:30 on 2 August 2016, the first patient arrived, closely followed by additional casualties with similar symptoms: e.g., headache, dizziness, shortness of breath, dry mouth, and itchy skin. The last case arrived at approximately 19:00 on 2 August 2016. In total, 20 patients were treated.

5.13 It appears that not all of the patients entered the tunnel; some had been outside.

5.14 All patients were stripped of their clothes, washed with soap and water, and dressed in hospital gowns. The majority of the patients were washed in the emergency department prior to going to the ward for further treatment.

5.15 Acetylcholinesterase (AChE) levels for some of the patients were checked to rule out the use of sarin. They also received atropine injections due to the agitation and constricted pupils, but when the blood results returned within normal limits, these tests were ceased.

5.16 Overall, oxygen saturations, blood pressure, and pulse readings were normal, as were all blood results (AChE, complete blood count, glucose, urea, and creatinine). Chest X-rays were also conducted on some patients and appeared normal.

5.17 No smell or any visual signs of skin irritation were noted, despite the patients complaining of itchiness.

5.18 The patients displaying altered consciousness generally woke up within four to five hours after arriving to the hospital, and were complaining of dizziness and headache. Prior to loss of consciousness, these patients complained of headache, dizziness, dry mouth, burning sensation, limb fatigue, nausea, vomiting, and overall varied symptoms. No patients were admitted to the intensive care unit or required intubation.

5.19 The medical staffs involved in the treatment were unable to identify any toxic substance that may have affected the patients.

5.20 The clothing from three of the casualties was stored in the director's office and handed over to the National Authority representatives on 28 August 2016, when they visited the hospital. The team was later granted access to the clothing for sampling purposes.

Described symptoms and treatment

5.21 In general, all patients were decontaminated with soap and water.

5.22 In some cases, intravenous access was gained with oxygen, saline fluids, and symptomatic drugs being administered on a case-by-case basis.

5.23 Some patients were prescribed antibiotics to prevent pneumonia, ranitidine for stomach complaints, and salbutamol inhalers for respiratory relief.

5.24 Despite normal oxygen saturations readings prior, it appears that shortness of breath or tightness in the chest was resolved with oxygen and salbutamol treatment where indicated.

5.25 Unconscious patients were monitored closely, but no definitive airway treatment was required.

5.26 Many patients were discharged either on the same day or within one to two days. The longest hospital stay was three days. Many patients continued with symptomatic medications for one to two weeks following the event.

5.27 Some patients were still complaining of symptoms (fatigue, shortness of breath, bitter taste in mouth, thirst, and headache) at the time of the interviews in October 2016.

Discrepancies

5.28 Some patients had no ongoing symptoms, while others complained of fatigue or had headaches, dry mouth, or were thirsty for weeks following the alleged event.

5.29 There was no specific pattern in the presentation of signs and symptoms in the patients. Some were confused and highly agitated, while others were calm. Other signs and symptoms included: altered consciousness, conjunctivitis, headache, irritated airways, shortness of breath or a feeling of suffocation, fatigue, dizziness, dry mouth, and burning sensation or itchiness of the skin, along with red eyes and red skin.

Sampling committee phase of the alleged event

5.30 A group comprised of three National Authority representatives was tasked with travelling to Aleppo between 27 and 29 August 2016 to conduct a preliminary investigation into the incident. This included travelling to the site, collecting samples, interviewing individuals connected with the incident, and collecting applicable medical data.

5.31 The committee travelled to the impact site and Al-Razi Hospital and interviewed soldiers, Civil Defence members, firefighters, and medical staff who were directly involved in the incident. They were handed samples that were reported to have come from the deceased, the

patients, and the soil from the site (this soil was taken from the surface above the tunnel, as the latter was no longer accessible).

5.32 The chemical specialist in the group tested the samples for traces of chemical agents, chlorine, carbon monoxide/dioxide, nitrogen monoxide/dioxide, phosgene, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, ammonia, and amines. The specialist could only report that there were increased ammonia readings on the tested clothing from the hospital (3 to 6 parts per million).

Discrepancies

5.33 There was a small variance in dates and times reported by the National Authority committee members; overall, however, their narratives were consistent.

Scientific Studies and Research Centre phase of the alleged event

5.34 The laboratory conducted a preliminary screening of the samples for mustard, cyanide, phosgene, chlorine, carbon monoxide, and nerve agents. A Dräger XAM 7000 device and colorimetric tubes were used for the screening of the above-mentioned substances. In addition, gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) and Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) were used to analyse the samples. Several compounds were identified in the samples, but no final conclusion was reached.

5.35 It was reported that the analytical chemistry laboratory at the SSRC is not specialised in the analysis of Chemical Weapons Convention-related substances.

Discrepancies

5.36 The laboratory equipment used to conduct the analyses is lacking calibration and maintenance logs.

Analysis of information provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the form of documents and services

5.37 The information and services provided by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic assisted the FFM in clarifying the following:

(a) the document entitled "Report on Poisoning with Toxic Gases on 02/08/2016", which offered a brief description of the alleged incident that took place on 2 August 2016, in Aleppo (referred to in Letter No. 122, dated 15 August 2016). This document provides an overview of the incident, as well as information regarding the location of the incident, the name of an armed opposition group reported to have been involved in the incident, photos of the location, images of some of the deceased persons, and the

names of the casualties and patients. The document also describes the rescue operation, the hospital treatment, the type of blood samples, and casualty signs and symptoms;

(b) several samples were collected by the National Authority committee but not all were analysed. The results of those that had been analysed were provided to the FFM;

(c) images from Google Earth were also provided by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic detailing the location related to the reported incident in Aleppo on 2 August 2016; and

(d) the National Authority provided the FFM with medical records of patients treated at Al-Razi Hospital.

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 While the prevailing narrative provided by the testimonies of those interviewed describes some form of ongoing combat operations in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo (Al-Hamam Point in Al-Aqaba area), the FFM is of the view that those affected in the alleged incident may have, in some instances, been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating substance.

6.2 However, the FFM considers that while the general clinical presentation of those affected in the incident is consistent with brief exposure to any number of chemicals or environmental insults, the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritant does not clearly indicate any specific chemical.

6.3 Based on the evidence presented by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic, the medical records that were reviewed, the results of the sample analyses, and the prevailing narrative of all of the interviews, the FFM cannot confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical was used as a weapon in the investigated incident. From the results of the analyses of the samples, the FFM is of the opinion that none of the chemicals identified are likely to be the cause of death of the casualties in the reported incident.

7. FACT-FINDING MISSION MANDATED AIMS

7.1 Gather facts regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon, as detailed in Letter No. 122 from the Syrian Arab Republic (dated 15 August 2016), mindful that the task of the FFM does not include the question of attributing responsibility for the alleged use.

7.2 Report to the Director-General upon conclusion of FFM activities.

8. OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

8.1 Review and analyse all available information pertaining to the reported incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.

8.2 Collect testimonies from persons alleged to have been affected by the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon, including those who underwent treatment, eyewitnesses of the alleged use of toxic chemicals, medical personnel, and other persons who had treated or come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of toxic chemicals, as detailed in Letter No. 122 from the Syrian Arab Republic (dated 15 August 2016).

8.3 If possible, and where safe to do so, visit the hospitals and other locations as deemed relevant to the conduct of its investigations.

8.4 Examine and, if possible, collect copies of the hospital records, including patient registers, treatment records, and any other relevant records, as deemed necessary.

8.5 Examine and, if possible, collect copies of any other documentation and records deemed necessary.

8.6 Take photographs and examine and, if possible, collect copies of video and telephone records.

8.7 Recover the samples held on behalf of the FFM at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in Barzi, Damascus.

8.8 If possible, and deemed necessary, physically examine and take samples from remnants of cylinders, containers, etc. alleged to have been used during the incident under investigation.

8.9 If possible, and deemed necessary, collect environmental samples at the alleged point of the incident and surrounding areas.

8.10 Provide the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with a duplicate or a portion of each environmental sample, if any, and, to the extent possible, a duplicate or portion of each of the biomedical samples collected in the course of the mission.

8.11 Cooperate fully with the relevant Syrian authorities with regard to all aspects of the mission.

8.12 Conduct all activities of the FFM in accordance with the relevant procedures of the Secretariat relating to the conduct of inspections during contingency operations, as applicable.

9. SIGNATURE

This Fact-Finding Mission report was submitted on 20 December 2016 in English.

[Signed]
Steven Wallis
Mission Leader

Annex 1

LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Name	DCN	Date	Info
Letter No. 122 SAR	#0185197	15/08/2016	Correspondence regarding toxic gas attack
NL 69 SAR	#0156350	16/08/2016	Correspondence regarding toxic gas attack
Letter to SAR, L/ODG/205745/16	#6568/023	30/08/2016	Advance team deployment
NV/ODG/206055/16	#6568/024	19/09/2016	Request to provide more information about alleged incident on 06/09/16
Letter to SAR, L/ODG/206193/16	#66568/025	26/09/2016	FFM main body deployment
SAR NV 96	#0125532	02/11/2016	Response to L/ODG/CDB/206391/16
NV/ODG/206802/16	#6597/059	03/11/2016	Request to provide more information about alleged incidents
SAR NV 106	#0125539	16/11/2016	Response to L/ODG/HP/206055/16

Annex 2

LIST OF INFORMATION RECEIVED/HANDED OVER DURING DEPLOYMENTS

First Deployment				
No.	**DCM**	**Description**	**Date Received/Handed Over**	
1.	6568/012	SD card - copies of photos from sampling	07/09/2016	Handed over
2.	6568/013	List of the seals applied on the samples	07/09/2016	Handed over
3.	6568/014	Copies of 20 medical records	07/09/2016	Received
4.	6568/015	Preliminary laboratory results of analysis	07/09/2016	Received
5.	6568/016	Report on poisoning with toxic gases on 02/08/16	07/09/2016	Received
6.	6568/017	Package of documents Aleppo 02/08/16	07/09/2016	Received
7.	6568/018	X-ray images	07/09/2016	Received
8.	6568/019	Package - CD with photos and lab results	07/09/2016	Received
Second Deployment				
No.	**DCM**	**Description**	**Date Received/Handed Over**	
1.	6597/012	Comparative list of names in English	12/10/2016	Handed over
2.	6597/013	Comparative list of names in Arabic	12/10/2016	Handed over
3.	6597/037	List of medical staff to be interviewed	12/10/2016	Handed over
4.	6597/038	List of interviewees	12/10/2016	Handed over
5.	6597/043	20 medical records - original	16/10/2016	Received
6.	6597/044	Copy of 1 medical record	16/10/2016	Received
7.	6597/046	List of seals - samples in joint custody	17/10/2016	Handed over
8.	6597/047	List of seals - samples for off-site analysis	17/10/2016	Handed over
9.	6597/049	SD card - copies of photos of samples packing	18/10/2016	Handed over

Annex 3

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES FROM THE SECOND DEPLOYMENT

DCN	Profession	Date of interview	DCN	Profession	Date of interview
10000	Soldier	13/10/2016	10038	Civil Defence member	15/10/2016
10001	Civil Defence member	13/10/2016	10043	Resident doctor	14/10/2016
10002	Firefighter	13/10/2016	10045	Nurse	14/10/2016
10003	Firefighter	13/10/2016	10046	Civil Defence member	15/10/2016
10004	Soldier	13/10/2016	10047	Doctor, toxicologist	14/10/2016
10005	Civil Defence member	13/10/2016	10048	Emergency department doctor	14/10/2016
10006	Firefighter	13/10/2016	10049	Nurse	14/10/2016
10013	Lab staff	17/10/2016	10051	Internal medicine doctor	14/10/2016
10032	Firefighter	15/10/2016	10052	Firefighter	15/10/2016
10034	Firefighter	15/10/2016	10041	Chemist	18/10/2016
10035	Firefighter	15/10/2016	10040	Senior officer, Syrian Arab Army	18/10/2016
10036	Firefighter	15/10/2016	10044	Senior staff member, SSRC	18/10/2016
10037	Senior firefighter	15/10/2016			

Annex 4

MAPPING OF INCIDENT LOCATION



Annex 5

LIST OF SAMPLES

No.	Sample Code	Description
1.	SD06S	Unheated carbon from canister
2.	SD07S	Heated carbon from canister
3.	SD13B	Canister (blank)
4.	SD08S	Filter content - metal oxide
5.	SD09S	Filter content - mixed carbon/metal oxide
6.	SL04S	Soil sample
7.	SL05S	Soil sample
8.	SD01S	Textile sample (black)
9.	SD02S	Textile sample (black/green)
10.	SD03S	Textile sample (orange hi vis)
11.	WP11S	Wipe sample from filter
12.	WP12S	Wipe from respirator face piece
13.	WP10B	Cotton and DCM (blank)
14.	WP10S	Wipe from O cylinder

Annex 6

SELECT SAMPLE PHOTOGRAPHS

Samples as initially received during first deployment:

Post-packaging for storage

Second deployment: Samples repackaged for transport to OPCW Laboratory



Annex 7

LIST OF MATERIAL GATHERED DURING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS

Entry	ERN	DCN	Interviewee Name / Code	Evidence Description	Evidence Collected/Received	
					When (Date and Time)	Where
1.	201610141004701	10047	10047	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 16:30	Damascus
2.	201610141004702	10047	10047	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 16:30	Damascus
3.	201610141004301	10043	10043	1 x MSD Audio recording	14/10/2016 16:30	Damascus
4.	201610141004302	10043	10043	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 16:30	Damascus
5.	201610141004901	10049	10049	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 16:35	Damascus
6.	201610141004902	10049	10049	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 16:35	Damascus
7.	201610131000401	10004	10004	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 16:45	Damascus
8.	201610131000402	10004	10004	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 16:45	Damascus

Entry	ERN	DCN	Interviewee Name / Code	Evidence Description	Evidence Collected/Received	
					When (Date and Time)	Where
9.	201610131000403	10004	10004	Drawing 1 page	14/10/2016 16:46	Damascus
10.	201610131000501	10005	10005	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:05	Damascus
11.	201610131000502	10005	10005	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:05	Damascus
12.	201610131000503	10005	10005	Drawing 1 page	14/10/2016 17:05	Damascus
13.	201610131000601	10006	10006	3 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:10	Damascus
14.	201610131000602	10006	10006	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:10	Damascus
15.	201610131000101	10001	10001	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:15	Damascus
16.	201610131000102	10001	10001	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:15	Damascus
17.	201610131000001	10000	10000	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:20	Damascus

Entry	ERN	DCN	Interviewee Name / Code	Evidence Description	Evidence Collected/Received	
					When (Date and Time)	Where
18.	201610131000002	10000	10000	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:20	Damascus
19.	201610131000201	10002	10002	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:20	Damascus
20.	201610131000202	10002	10002	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:20	Damascus
21.	201610131000301	10003	10003	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:30	Damascus
22.	201610131000302	10003	10003	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:30	Damascus
23.	201610141004501	10045	10045	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:30	Damascus
24.	201610141004502	10045	10045	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:30	Damascus
25.	201610141004801	10048	10048	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:40	Damascus
26.	201610141004802	10048	10048	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:40	Damascus

Entry	ERN	DCN	Interviewee Name / Code	Evidence Description	Evidence Collected/Received	
					When (Date and Time)	Where
27.	201610141005101	10051	10051	1 x MSD Audio Recording	14/10/2016 17:50	Damascus
28.	201610141005102	10051	10051	1 x SD Card Video Recording	14/10/2016 17:50	Damascus
29.	201610151003801	10038	10038	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:00	Damascus
30.	201610151003802	10038	10038	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:00	Damascus
31.	201610151004601	10046	10046	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus
32.	201610151004602	10046	10046	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus
33.	201610151004603	10046	10046	1 x Drawing	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus
34.	201610151003201	10032	10032	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus
35.	201610151003202	10032	10032	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus

Entry	ERN	DCN	Interviewee Name / Code	Evidence Description	Evidence Collected/Received	
					When (Date and Time)	Where
36.	201610151005201	10052	10052	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus
37.	201610151005202	10052	10052	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:30	Damascus
38.	201610151003601	10036	10036	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:15	Damascus
39.	201610151003602	10036	10036	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:15	Damascus
40.	201610151003603	10036	10036	1 x Map	15/10/2016 20:15	Damascus
41.	201610151003501	10035	10035	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:20	Damascus
42.	201610151003502	10035	10035	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:20	Damascus
43.	201610151003401	10034	10034	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:25	Damascus
44.	201610151003402	10034	10034	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:25	Damascus

Entry	ERN	DCN	Interviewee Name / Code	Evidence Description	Evidence Collected/Received	
					When (Date and Time)	Where
45.	201610151003701	10037	10037	1 x MSD Audio Recording	15/10/2016 20:00	Damascus
46.	201610151003702	10037	10037	1 x SD Card Video Recording	15/10/2016 20:00	Damascus
47.	201610171001301	10013	10013	1 x MSD Audio Recording	17/10/2016 17:00	Damascus
48.	201610171001302	10013	10013	1 x MSD Audio Recording	17/10/2016 17:00	Damascus
49.	201610171001303	10013	10013	1 x SD Photos	17/10/2016 17:00	Damascus

Annex 8

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES RECEIVED FROM FFM/007/16 CONDUCTED AT THE OPCW LABORATORY

1 December 2016

Executive summary

1. As requested by FFM/007/16 and as approved by the Director-General on 4 November 2016 (the approval of the request is included in Memorandum M/VER/LAB/206849/16), the OPCW Laboratory conducted an analysis of the environmental samples received from the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) team.

2. The scope of the analysis included scheduled chemicals, precursors, and degradation products. The analysis also aimed to gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the samples.

3. A total of 14 samples were received (including blanks), of which 13 were analysed (see main text for an explanation).

4. Only textile sample SD02S contained reportable chemicals or chemicals of interest for the purpose of the analysis.

5. Methyl diethanolamine (MDEA, Schedule 3.B.16), a precursor for nitrogen mustard, was identified in sample SD02S. This chemical is also found in commercial products such as certain detergents.

6. In addition, both benzylchloride and benzylbromide were found in sample SD02S. Both of these chemicals are strong irritants (lachrymators) and were used not only for that purpose as a warfare agent in World War 1, but also for training purposes due to their non-lethal nature. Exposure of casualties to these chemicals in larger amounts should have resulted in extensive eye irritation and watering eyes.

7. None of the chemicals found can serve as an explanation for the rapid death of victims in the related incident.

8. An analysis of a protective mask filter was inconclusive, as the provided blank filter turned out to be of a different type than the filter worn by one of the fatalities. This makes it impossible to rule out the chemicals used for impregnation of the filter.

Initial situation

9. FFM team FFM/007/16 handed over samples to the OPCW Laboratory on 1 November 2016 and provided background information on the samples. The team requested an analysis focusing on the presence of scheduled chemicals, precursors, and degradation products. This request was made in document FFM/001/16/6597/005.

10. The OPCW Laboratory submitted Memorandum M/VER/LAB/206849/16 to the Director-General, recommending that an analysis of the samples be conducted at the OPCW Laboratory as requested by the team. The Director-General approved this request on 4 November 2016.

11. It is noted that no full chain of custody exists for the samples in question prior to the moment of receipt by the team. Information received from the team does not point to a specific toxic chemical or group of toxic chemicals responsible for the fatalities in the investigated incident.

12. No autopsy of fatalities was conducted and no biomedical samples are available. Based on available data, a targeted analysis was not possible.

Analysis results

13. The 14 samples received include activated carbon from a mask canister, powder (indicated as metal oxide) from a mask filter, soil textiles, and extracts from wipe samples. The samples include blanks. An intact and unused mask filter was provided to serve as a blank comparison for the charcoal from the filter of one of the fatalities. One of the samples was a slip of the charcoal from the mask filter that was heated in some previous experiments. As this sample was of less value than the unheated charcoal, no analysis was conducted on this sample (SD07S).

14. Chemicals of interest were only found in sample textile SD02S. (Methyl diethanolamine was identified by GC-MS(EI) as its TMS and TBDMS derivative, benzylbromide and benzylchloride were identified by GC-MS(EI) underivatised).

Chemical name	Structure	Sample code	Comments
Methyl diethanolamine		SD02S	Nitrogen mustard precursor, Schedule 3.B.16
Benzylbromide		SD02S	Lachrymator and irritant, not scheduled
Benzylchloride		SD02S	Lachrymator and irritant, not scheduled

Problems with the mask filter "blank"

15. An unused mask filter was provided (SD13B) as a "blank". The filter was opened and the activated charcoal from the filter was removed to serve as blank material. Charcoal used in such filters are impregnated with certain chemicals and the use of a blank would enable an analyst to differentiate between a chemical that was already on the charcoal from production, and one that had been deposited on the charcoal by the inhalation of contaminated air.

16. A visual inspection of both the charcoal from the blank SD13B as a well as the charcoal from sample SD06S revealed a different physical appearance (see photo below). Photos made available by the team then also revealed that the filters were not of identical make, but instead showed a somewhat different shape. Therefore, the above-mentioned comparison could not be conducted.

17. Thermal desorption of sample SD06S yielded a peak with prominent mask peaks at m/z 45 and m/z 60 (molecular ion). This is indicative of acetic acid. Only ions with m/z > 44 were recorded (to exclude the dominant influence of CO2). However, extracts of the same charcoal with polar and non-polar solvents did not confirm the presence of acetic acid.

Different appearance of charcoal from "blank" sample SD13B (left in both photos) and "real" sample SD06S (right in both pictures)

Conclusions

18. None of the identified chemicals are likely to be the cause of death of the fatalities in the incident. Methyl diethanolamine is a nitrogen mustard precursor, but is also found in commercial detergents. Signs of nitrogen mustard exposure were not apparent in the casualties.

19. The identified lachrymators and irritants benzylbromide and benzychloride are strongly harassing chemicals even at low concentrations. They are generally considered non-lethal and would—due to their irritating nature—trigger a strong urge to escape the exposure. As they

are strong lachrymators, one would expect strong eye irritation and watery eyes. However, the presence of these chemicals at low concentration might explain the short-term skin and lung irritation reported by other witnesses of the incident.

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Annex II

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the note by the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons entitled "Summary update of the activities carried out by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria in 2016" (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

OPCW **Technical Secretariat**

S/1445/2016
27 December 2016
Original: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

SUMMARY UPDATE OF THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA IN 2016

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with Executive Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015) and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) has continued to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria, including that provided by the Syrian Arab Republic as well as by others.

2. This summary provides an update on the Fact-Finding Mission's activities in 2016 in accordance with the aforementioned Executive Council decisions, as well as United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015).

METHODOLOGY RELATED TO THE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION

3. As recommended by the Executive Council, the FFM has collected and studied all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. This includes information provided in notes verbales by the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as other sources.

4. For each allegation of use, the FFM conducts an initial evaluation of the incident based on all available information. Each incident is then categorised using the following criteria:

   (a) **High**: There is significant information consistent with the use of chemicals as weapons.

(b) **Medium**: There is some information lending credence to the possibility of the use of chemicals, but it is currently insufficient to make a confident assessment of consistency with the use of chemicals as weapons.

(c) **Low**: There is no or little available information, or the information available suggests a low likelihood of the use of chemicals as weapons.

5. Initial assessments may alter over time as more information becomes available.

6. The FFM applies a number of methods of evaluation, including, but not limited to:

(a) research into the incidents and existing reports;

(b) assessment and corroboration of background information;

(c) meetings or interviews with potential witnesses, either in person or using remote technology;

(d) review of documentation and records provided by interviewees;

(e) review of photographs, video, and audio material;

(f) assessment of the symptoms of casualties as reported by interviewees.

7. In order to gather facts regarding incidents of alleged use of chemicals as weapons, the FFM has deployed several times throughout the year in order to conduct interviews and collect additional evidence, including samples.

8. Further investigation may be carried out for allegations categorised as medium-high.

OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION REVIEWED

Notes Verbales from the Syrian Arab Republic

9. The Technical Secretariat has received 46 notes verbales from the Syrian Arab Republic (classified as Protected) between January 2016 and 20 November 2016, which contain information that is potentially relevant to the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. These are listed in Annex 1.

10. Two of these notes verbales requested the FFM to investigate specific incidents of the possible use of chemicals as weapons. The remaining 44 notes verbales conveyed information relating to alleged perpetrators, including potential supply routes and storage locations. Eight of these 44 notes verbales also referenced allegations of the use of chemicals as weapons. The FFM has requested the Syrian Arab Republic to provide additional supporting information, such as

intelligence reports or documentation, to substantiate this information and to facilitate the assessment process.

Other sources

11. From December 2015 to 20 November 2016, the FFM recorded 65 potential incidents of the use of chemical weapons reported in open sources. These are listed in Annex 2.

12. The FFM has actively pursued further information, including information provided by States Parties, the United Nations (including the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in Damascus), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and potential witnesses, as well as in-depth research on the Internet.

FACT-FINDING ACTIVITIES

13. As noted above, the FFM has deployed on several occasions in order to gather relevant facts. All deployments and movement of the FFM took place with all necessary authorisations, including authorisation from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).

Information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic

14. With respect to the investigation requested by the Syrian Arab Republic in its note verbale number 69, the FFM conducted two visits to Damascus. During the initial deployment, the advance team discussed the future conduct of the mission. During this deployment, the FFM attended a number of meetings with the National Authority and was provided with:

(a) a briefing on the incident that occurred in the area of Al Awamid in Aleppo on 2 August 2016;

(b) a written report regarding the incident;

(c) a package of documents that included patient medical records and x-ray images of casualties admitted to the hospital as a result of the incident;

(d) a medical report on the cause of death of one of the fatalities;

(e) preliminary laboratory results concerning a number of samples that the National Authority had retrieved from the site of the incident; and

(f) access to the Syrian Scientific and Research Centre (SSRC) in Barzeh to secure the samples mentioned in (e) above.

15. During the second deployment, the FFM conducted interviews and recovered 14 samples from the SSRC in Barzeh for onward transport to the OPCW Laboratory at Rijswijk, The Hague.

16. Interviews were carried out with the following persons:

(a) 13 casualties;

(b) 8 medical staff involved in the treatment of the casualties;

(c) 1 member of staff involved in the receipt of the samples mentioned in paragraph 13 (e) above; and

(d) 3 members of the National Authority committee that retrieved the samples.

17. Samples consisted of:

(a) soil;

(b) clothing;

(c) a canister and wipe samples from a mask; and

(d) an oxygen cylinder.

18. A report has been issued regarding the alleged incident on 2 August 2016 in Al Awamid, Aleppo.

19. At the time of writing this report, a deployment of the FFM to the Syrian Arab Republic took place as per the request of the Syrian Arab Republic in note verbale number 109, dated 17 November 2016. The team is currently translating and analysing the interview recordings and associated documentation, and is awaiting analysis of the samples that were transferred to the OPCW Laboratory.

20. Further samples have been left, under seal, in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Information provided by other sources

21. In six alleged incidents, the FFM conducted 13 remote audio interviews and two in-person interviews.

22. The information provided through these interviews will require further substantiation and corroborating evidence in order for the FFM to make factual findings on the alleged incidents.

23. The lack of access to witnesses and supporting evidence continues to present challenges for further required investigation.

NEXT STEPS

24. The next phase of the FFM's work will concentrate on building upon its analysis of available evidence through the continued collection and evaluation of relevant information and evidence through all means available.

25. The FFM will provide more detailed reports in due course, including information on all relevant methodology.

Annexes: English only

Annex 1: Notes Verbales Received from the Syrian Arab Republic in 2016 (up to 20 November) with Potential Relevance to the Use of Chemicals as Weapons

Annex 2: Open source Allegations of the Use of Chemicals as Weapons, from 1 December 2015 to 21 November 2016

Annex 1

NOTES VERBALES RECEIVED FROM THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC IN 2016 (UP TO 20 NOVEMBER) WITH POTENTIAL RELEVANCE TO THE ALLEGED SUPPLY, STORAGE AND USE OF CHEMICALS AS WEAPONS

	Date of NV	No.	Transmission of information (TI) or request for action (RA)	Summary
1.	5 January	4	TI	Supply of toxic chemicals
2.	15 January	8	TI	Supply of toxic chemical
3.	1 February	12	TI	Targeting of areas with chemicals in an attempt to mislead.
4.	2 February	13	TI	Supply of chemicals
5.	5 February	16	TI	Acquisition and development of missiles .
6.	5 February	17	TI	Smuggling of chemicals
7.	8 February	19	TI	Reference to a chemical attack at an airport on 2 February 2016
8.	8 February	20	TI	Reference to a chemical attack on 19 March 2013
9.	15 February	22	TI	Supply of toxic gas and intention to use
10.	30 March	34	TI	Supply of chemicals and storage location
11.	19 April	39	TI	Information regarding attack (Tanaf)
12.	04 May	40	TI	Supply of chemicals and storage location
13.	06 May	42	TI	Supply of chemicals and distribution of masks
14.	11 May	43	TI	Transport and storage of toxic chemicals.
15.	06 June	48	TI	Smuggling of chemicals from neighbouring country
16.	17 Jun	54	TI	Chemical attack on 13 June 2016
17.	07 July	58	TI	Request for answers from a neighbouring country
18.	11 July	59	TI	Storage locations
19.	11 July	60	TI	Targeting of Sheikh Maqsoud 08 March and 07 April 2016
20.	12 July	62	TI	Activities in the area of Sheikh Bahr in Idlib
21.	14 July	64	TI	Activity related to toxic chemicals
22.	16 August	69	RA	Attaches letter 122 which contains information on Al-Awamid and requests investigation by FFM.
23.	17 August	70	TI	Filling of CW
24.	26 September	76	TI	Storage of nitrate and napalm
25.	29 September	77	TI	Intention to use toxic chemicals
26.	03 October	78	TI	Coordination of use of CW
27.	05 October	79	TI	Information on attack on Um Hoosh
28.	05 October	80	TI	Intention to use and storage location
29.	10 October	82	TI	Storage of toxic chemicals and their potential use

	Date of NV	No.	Transmission of information (TI) or request for action (RA)	Summary
30.	10 October	83	TI	Theft and moving of toxic chemicals
31.	10 October	84	TI	Smuggling and transport of toxic chemicals
32.	18 October	88	TI	Stockpiling of toxic chemicals
33.	19 October	89	TI	Location of CW supplied from neighbouring country
34.	1 November	90	TI	Supply of CW to terrorists by neighbouring country
35.	1 November	92	TI	Intention of transportation of toxic chemicals by terrorists
36.	1 November	93	TI	Possession and location of CW by terrorists
37.	1 November	94	TI	Intention of terrorist organisation to attack civilians and fabricate evidence
38.	1 November	95	TI	Transport of CW from neighbouring country
39.	02 November	96	TI	Document classification
40.	04 November	97	TI	Export of CW
41.	04 November	98	TI	Preparation of CW by terrorist organisation
42.	10 November	101	TI	Preparation for targeting of military forces and civilians with toxic chemicals.
43.	14 November	105	TI	Attack on 03 November
44.	16 November	106	TI	Including CD, claims fabricated footage and explains why invalid with respect to CW. Reiterate N° 60 with regards to Sheikh Maqsoud
45.	16 November	108	TI	Storage of toxic chemicals and planned attacks
46.	17 November	109	RA	Attaches letter 259 which references 3 toxic attacks and requests investigation by the OPCW.

Annex 2

OPEN SOURCE ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICALS AS WEAPONS, 1 DECEMBER 2015 TO 21 NOVEMBER 2016

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
	2015			
1.	20 December	Teir Maalah	Homs	https://twitter.com/zuzamikulova/status/678845889956487168, https://twitter.com/EatingMyPeaz/status/678707512338595840, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=931307936918784
2.	22 December	Moadamiyah	Rif Damashq	https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/13165.html, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2015/23-december-report-from-on-sarin-gas-attack-in-western-ghouta, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHO4VvJSiUQ, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BAU118uA10, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1H4kbEE3A9E3pbkj45Gd8LJ4YAJ-KWTXGJkJvAYjvrYs/mobilebasic?pli=1, http://www.iloubnan.info/politics/91663/The-Syrian-Coalition-accuses-the-Assad-regime-of-new-chemical-attack-against-civilians, https://t.co/R1IXC8fDRp, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Dec-23/328727-syria-activists-accuse-government-of-chemical-attack.ashx#.VnqBmns6ja0.twitter, http://eaworldview.com/2015/12/syria-developing-another-regime-chemical-attack-near-damascus/, https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=979121872145932&set=vb.778523135539141&type=2&theater, http://youtu.be/uBipzVHTIEg, https://t.co/V36SpBeShG, https://t.co/dttpPyCB5h, https://t.co/cnDuWI5UDT, https://t.co/4tlINVfg4S, http://youtu.be/LIUrcflXpDg,
3.	27 December	Jobar	Damascus	https://twitter.com/KenanRahmani/status/681114215252283392
	2016			
4.	23 January	al-Nashabiyah	Rif Damashq	http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/23-january-reports-of-chemical-attack-by-saa-targeting-alnashabiyah, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/23-january-reports-of-chemical-attack-by-saa-targeting-alnashabiyah, https://twitter.com/PatsCSW/status/690975419256967168, https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/690959018769125378

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
5.	31 January	Ghouta	Rif Damashq	https://twitter.com/arrahmah/status/694038744651821056, https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/status/693863618400686080, http://en.eldorar.com/node/1348, https://twitter.com/DorarShami/status/693904053345083394, http://www.arrahmah.com/news/2016/02/01/helikopter-rezim-asad-menjatuhkan-puluhan-bom-barel-yang-mengandung-gas-beracun-di-ghouta-barat.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
6.	31 January	Moadamiyah	Rif Damashq	http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-january-assad-helos-dropped-52-bombs-on-moadamia-today, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-february-assad-forces-bombing-al-moadiamyeh-and-daraya, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-january-victims-of-suffocation-after-shelling-on-moadamiyah, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-january-alghoutahospital-registered-so-far-97cases-of, https://twitter.com/RobPulseNews/status/693887279056588801?lang=en, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoeYmBnP7GQ, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BULMFFEOa1k, https://twitter.com/CanelaNisa/status/693855866760486912
7.	8 March	Sheikh Maksoud	Aleppo	https://www.rt.com/news/334928-ypg-syria-chemical-attack/, http://aranews.net/2016/03/syrian-islamists-bomb-kurdish-district-aleppo-chemical-weapons-ypg/, https://www.google.it/maps/place/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE+%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%8C+%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8, %D8%8C+%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%E2%80%AD/@36.2315665,37.1539304,13.67z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x152ff9b647cff37f:0x41f2c57414a6e0ee, https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/707314665634660352, https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/707311390936080384,
8.	13 March	Sheikh Maksoud	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/MmaGreen/status/709092339508051972, https://twitter.com/Conflicts/status/709095664999899137, https://twitter.com/QSD00963/status/709094223111458816
9.	3 April	Qaboun	Rif Damashq	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_BxHD5A2BE&feature=youtu.be, https://twitter.com/ARnews1936/status/716730561696497665, https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/716712197527846912, https://twitter.com/IsraelsVoice/status/716864932734570497, https://www.facebook.com/493368000712782/photos/a.513998488649733.1073741828.493368000712782/991418034241107/?type=1&theater, http://all4syria.info/Archive/304307, https://www.facebook.com/harstarevo/posts/819355664875924, https://twitter.com/andreaskorinov/status/716983664136028161,

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/716710957192450049 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ri_fwHXukc https://www.facebook.com/624868630991757/photos/a.631525046992782.1073741828.624868630991757/840646739413944/?type=1&theater https://youtu.be/x_BxHD5A2BE, https://twitter.com/RafekAboazan/status/716678333593952260 https://twitter.com/MohammedGazal87/status/716701874976649216 https://twitter.com/akhbar/status/716713099160584193, http://eldorar.com/node/96535
10.	4 April	Deir Ez-zor airbase	Deir Ez-zor	https://www.rt.com/news/338426-isis-syria-poisonous-gas-attack/, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/04/05/ISIS-use-mustard-gas-in-Deir-Ezzor-airport-attack-.html, http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-chemical-attacks-islamic-state-used-mustard-gas-during-attack-syrian-military-2348369, http://www.albawaba.com/news/daesh-launches-chemical-attack-syrian-military-airport-825356, http://khorasannews-en.com/en/doc/news/3412/daesh-uses-mustard-gas-in-attack-on-syria-airbase, http://www.newsone.tv/world/islamic-state-militants-use-mustard-gas-in-attack-on-deir-al-zor-airport-in-syria, http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-militants-idINKCN0X12GO, http://www.france24.com/en/20160405-deadly-gas-attack-syria-army-state-media?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date=2016-04-05&dlvrit=66745, https://twitter.com/HKX07/status/717125022490431488, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-chemical-weapons-militants-use-mustard-gas-against-syrian-forces-in-battle-for-deir-ez-zor-a6969186.html, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/04/05/ISIS-use-mustard-gas-in-Deir-Ezzor-airport-attack-.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter, http://sana.sy/?p=363661, http://sana.sy/en/?p=73686, http://en.alalam.ir/news/1805275, https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2016/Apr-05/345702-isis-use-mustard-gas-in-attack-on-deir-al-zor-airport-syrian-state-tv.ashx, https://francais.rt.com/international/18562-daesh-a-utilise-armes-chimiques, http://www.worldakhbar.com/middle-east/syria/56458.html
11.	7 April	Sheikh Maksoud	Aleppo	http://jinhaber.info/en/ALL-NEWS/content/view/49902, https://twitter.com/AylinaKilic/status/718067407101771776, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sg-Xxa68VIo,

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				http://www.aryenhaber.org/haber/2954/aleppo-four-civilians-poisoned-24-killed-in-sheikh-maqsoud-attacks, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtBgQ1mlUGM&feature=youtu.be, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566845-syria-kurds-accuse-rebels-of-toxic-gas-attack, http://en.alalam.ir/news/1806220, https://twitter.com/MassKnowledge/status/720890299065757696, https://www.facebook.com/RojavaDefenseUnits/posts/985875974816130 https://twitter.com/defenseunits/ https://twitter.com/islamalloush0/status/718121743949414403 https://twitter.com/islamalloush0/status/719877882017943552 https://twitter.com/islamalloush0/status/718410175934263296, https://twitter.com/mutludc/status/718638812243632128
12.	9 April	AlTanf	Homs	https://twitter.com/KyleWOrton/status/718856394766729216 https://twitter.com/CombatChris1/status/718851278143680512 https://twitter.com/CombatChris1/status/718847874818248704 https://twitter.com/NorthernStork/status/718850931270500352 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/06/british-special-forces-operating-inside-syria-alongside-rebels/, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/176251/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF, http://www.alasalawatanmya.com/2016/04/09/%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD/
13.	11 April	Al Mayadeen	Deir Ez-zor	http://isis.liveuamap.com/en/2016/11-april-saa-used-chemical-weapons-against-isis-in-senae, https://twitter.com/bonniekipperman/status/719474411531800576
14.	11 April (may be same as 9 April)	AlTanf	Homs	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpT-ZfHLZfc&feature=youtu.be, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/11-april-fsa-nsa-in-altanf-showing-evidence-of-isis-chemical, https://twitter.com/KyleWOrton/status/718856394766729216, https://twitter.com/YallaSouriya/status/719677727574392832 https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/04/12/syria-deir-ezzor-rockets-shelled-by-daesh-in-tanf-with-poisonous-gazes/

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
15.	12 April	Sheikh Maksoud	Aleppo	http://www.anfenglish.com/kurdistan/gang-groups-attack-sheikh-maqsoud-with-chemical-gas,
16.	14 April	Handarat	Aleppo	Address of link not saved at the time.
17.	16 April	Mt Dakwah	Rif Damashq	https://twitter.com/Aquila_Fortis/status/721394895269838849 https://twitter.com/RamiALLolah/status/721363695557812226
18.	18 April	Al-Eis	Aleppo	http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Dozens-of-Hezbollah-militants-accidentally-killed-in-chemical-attack-451476?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter, http://www.kataeb.org/regional/2016/04/18/report-hezbollah-militants-accidentally-killed-in-syria-chemical-attack, http://www.fggam.org/2016/04/report-dozens-of-hezbollah-militants-accidentally-killed-in-chemical-attack/, http://m.aljarida.com/pages/news_more/2012811585/0, https://www.mojahedin.org/newsen/45547?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter,
19.	18 April	al-Amqiyah Village	Hama	https://www.facebook.com/LCCSy/posts/1371673949526404, https://twitter.com/rien4djri/status/722130534818820096, https://twitter.com/CombatChris1/status/722108786018820097, https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/amiqa?source=feed_text&story_id=1371673949526404,
20.	24 April	Jisr al Shughur	Idlib	https://twitter.com/rien4djri/status/7246832747155415O4, https://twitter.com/Syricide/status/602566962451972096, https://www.facebook.com/493368000712782/photos/a.513998488649733.1073741828.493368000712782/1003514566364787/?type=1&theater, http://en.eldorar.com/node/2114, https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/724532893817671680, http://www.futuretvnetwork.com/node/211097, https://twitter.com/CanelaNisa/status/724402796326322176 https://twitter.com/Bivi_17/status/724486689536790528, https://twitter.com/TimInHonolulu/status/726867317699682305
21.	26 April	Taqa village, near Shaddadi, ~60 km S of Hasakah city	Al Hasakah	http://aranews.net/2016/04/isis-targets-syrian-democratic-forces-chemical-weapons/, http://www.anfenglish.com/kurdistan/sdf-isis-attacked-our-positions-in-shaddadi-with-chemical-gas, http://kurdishdailynews.org/2016/04/27/turkey-backed-isis-terrorists-attack-kurdish-positions-in-shaddadi-with-chemical-gas-sdf/, https://twitter.com/Delvin_Azem/status/725568694244495361, https://twitter.com/DefenseUnits/status/725304752393826306, https://twitter.com/IntellFusion/status/725637720765272064

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
22.	1 May	Al-Aqaba, Aleppo City	Aleppo	http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-may-unconfirmed-but-halab-news-reports-an-assad-toxic-gas, https://twitter.com/HalabNewsN/status/726832442179485701, https://twitter.com/TimInHonolulu/status/726867317699682305 https://www.facebook.com/HNN.Halab/posts/749814008455197
23.	2 May	North Aleppo	Aleppo	Address of link not saved at the time.
24.	22 May	Jobar	Damascus	https://twitter.com/JobarRev/status/734826792784134144, https://twitter.com/Malcolmite/status/734783297658736640, https://syrianpc.com/en/regime-forces-targeted-jobar-district-in-damascus-with-chlorine-after-failing-to-break-into/, https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF?source=feed_text&story_id=613922888767579
25.	17 May	Sheikh Maksoud	Aleppo	http://english.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?eid=270301&cid=23&fromval=1&frid=23&seccatid=20&s1=1#.VzxudSNBVjI.twitter, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAESuOs0R0c
26.	30 May	Al-Waar	Homs	https://twitter.com/QasiounNewsAR/status/737228575057793024
27.	15 June	E Ghouta	Rif Damashq	http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2016/06/17/470840/Syria%20Damascus%20Ghouta%20chemical%20arms, http://sana.sy/en/?p=80313 http://www.sana.sy/?p=394743 (translation of doctor available) http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons-idUKKCN0Z21UZ https://uk.news.yahoo.com/syria-govt-says-rebels-poisonous-weapons-insurgents-deny-143832500.html http://3robanews.com/arab/19382/%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9.html https://arabic.rt.com/news/827991-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A- %D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82- %D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85- %D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9- %D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA- %D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82/ http://www.aliwaa.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=288997 (minor mention in larger article) http://news.trust.org/item/20160616144138-q8x3l/?source=fiOtherNews2http://news.trust.org/item/20160616144138-q8x3l/?source=fiOtherNews2

28.	22 June	Near Tabqa (to the South) in W Raqqa	Raqqa	https://www.almayadeen.net/latestnews/2016/6/22/210184/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7;
				https://www.facebook.com/2.Network.Aleppocountryside.89/?fref=nf;
				http://syrianow.sy/index.php?d=69&id=145458;
				http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160622/1041773915/daesh-gas-raqqa.html,
				http://www.voltairenet.org/article192492.html, http://alhurrahadath.com/5700--.html,
				http://www.faceiraq.com/inews.php?id=4887710,
				http://www.voltairenet.org/article192488.html
				https://twitter.com/RamiALLolah/status/745645840379809792,
				https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/status/746022102977904641

29.	23 June	Haritan	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/rami_swed/status/746477013112881153; https://twitter.com/salqin/status/746456843170516993 https://twitter.com/almotasem8/status/747144601883054081 https://twitter.com/Wesal_TV/status/746477969644871680 https://twitter.com/shahed_alep/status/746445326777745410 https://twitter.com/95_aboislam/status/746444299936595969 https://twitter.com/ff5b413dda60423/status/746433998226743296 https://twitter.com/ahbah7/status/746430170475692033 https://twitter.com/HalabTodayTV/status/746429705121832960

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				https://twitter.com/HalabTodayTV/status/746597713819631616 https://twitter.com/ahmad09904/status/747184349267755008 https://twitter.com/ZakariaNassani/status/746443861199847425 https://twitter.com/RevolutionSyria/status/745873637182431232 https://twitter.com/xmanw2011/status/745386208713388032 https://twitter.com/SyrianCoalition/status/745180922668949505 https://twitter.com/ZakariaNassani/status/744885292885221376; https://twitter.com/fadail_al_ilm/status/746498635702112256 https://www.instagram.com/p/BHESnL1h4Oz/ https://twitter.com/sh3uibalskar20/status/746587636651851776
30.	26 June	East Ghouta	Rif Damashq	http://coolamnews.com/utilisation-darmes-chimiques-dans-la-zone-rurale-a-lest-de-damas/
31.	29 June	Jobar	Damascus	http://www.orient-news.net/en/news_show/116292/0/Assad-terrorists-attack-Damascus-Jobar-with-poisonous-gas https://twitter.com/OrientNewsEn/status/748342891311955968 https://twitter.com/EagleSyrian1/status/748193259848105984 https://www.facebook.com/Douma.Revolution.2011/posts/1077680792312835, https://twitter.com/observesyria/status/748437523399991296, http://www.voa-islam.com/read/world-news/2016/06/30/44942/rezim-teroris-assad-serang-daerah-oposisi-di-jobar-damaskus-dengan-gas-beracun/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter#sthash.gUzjqlgk.dpbs, http://www.nabdsyria.tv/Article/8684, https://twitter.com/syrianews_now/status/748226498901983232
32.	29 June	Al-Mallah	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/news_syrianall1/status/748543065644736515, https://twitter.com/N_workMediaHoms/status/748420401391411200 https://twitter.com/syria_pulse/status/748432198831841280 https://twitter.com/azsxa23/status/748432244298088448 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_9n9XVFeJo&feature=youtu.be https://twitter.com/news_syrianall1/status/748543065644736515, https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/06/29/syriaalepporegime-targets-al-malah-with-chlorine/, https://www.facebook.com/SYRIA.AGENCY/posts/1014611785242782, https://twitter.com/mheealden88/status/748222377348177920, https://twitter.com/Syria_Rebels/status/748219024102801408, https://www.facebook.com/ShaamNetwork.Arabic/posts/1212312535485985, https://twitter.com/rayhane_alsham/status/749702722195169280 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=646151398875512&id=100004419735788

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
33.	3 July	Karm Al-Myassar	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/ALAMAWI/status/749698157068574720,
34.	20 July	Kafr Hamrah	Aleppo	https://syrianpc.com/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%83%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88/, https://www.facebook.com/HalabTodayTV/posts/1440177709332996
35.	23 July	Various, Aleppo City	Aleppo	http://alburaq-media.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%AA-2016723-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7/
36.	1 August	Saraqeb	Idlib	https://twitter.com/AJABreaking/status/760231221653827584, https://twitter.com/Conflicts/status/760350223843680256 https://twitter.com/reportedly/status/760233110835335169 https://twitter.com/JoeEEnglish/status/760348715605434369 https://twitter.com/JakeGodin/status/760285721475198976 https://twitter.com/NoorNahas1/status/760284229741740032 https://twitter.com/whitehelmets_sy/status/760239870354792448 https://twitter.com/EagleSyrian1/status/760229732877266945 http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-august-several-suffocated-including-a-child-and-woman-in, https://twitter.com/Syria_Rebels/status/760213137505259520 https://twitter.com/salqin/status/760218226764738560 https://twitter.com/RadioAlKul/status/760214312636088320 https://twitter.com/HosamAlhaji/status/760217421479280641, http://www.interpretermag.com/august-01-2016/#14721, http://globalnews.ca/news/2861443/authorities-play-blame-game-after-toxic-gas-attack-in-syrias-aleppo/, http://www.presstv.us/Detail/2016/08/03/478214/Syria-Aleppo-gas-attack-Saraqib, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Terrorist-chemical-weapon-attack-kills-5-in-Aleppo-Syrian-regime-claims-463042
37.	2 August	Old City in Aleppo	Aleppo	http://sana.sy/en/?p=84234, http://globalnews.ca/news/2861443/authorities-play-blame-game-after-toxic-gas-attack-in-syrias-aleppo/, https://southfront.org/militants-use-chemical-weapons-in-aleppo-city/, http://www.presstv.us/Detail/2016/08/03/478214/Syria-Aleppo-gas-attack-Saraqib, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Terrorist-chemical-weapon-attack-kills-5-in-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				Aleppo-Syrian-regime-claims-463042, http://z-news.xyz/the-militants-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-in-aleppo/, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-idUSKCN10F220?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%29
38.	2 August	Kafr Takarem	Idlib	https://twitter.com/AbdalmalikSy/status/760237340132577280, https://twitter.com/syriafree339/status/760243395902201856
39.	No date given[1]	Al-Aqaba	Aleppo	http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13950525001024
40.	7 August	Ramouseh	Aleppo	https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/191104/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=smart+news+agency+++-+++%D9%88%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9+%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA+%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1
41.	8 August	Khan Al-asal	Aleppo	https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/191104/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=smart+news+agency+++-+++%D9%88%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9+%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA+%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1, https://www.facebook.com/SMARTNewsAgency/?fref=ts, https://twitter.com/barq_news/status/762580579753787392, https://twitter.com/jisrtv/status/762642102589255680, https://twitter.com/MediaCenterfr/status/762597827369402368, https://twitter.com/Syriamubasher/status/762593698387488768,

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				https://twitter.com/alnateq2/status/762585682611204096, https://twitter.com/shahed_alep/status/762579941527588866, https://twitter.com/AleppoAMC/status/762569227932987392, https://twitter.com/ALAMAW1/status/762564875642175492, https://twitter.com/Maraei_Halabi/status/762563385087197184
42.	10 August	Zubdiya, Aleppo	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/TheSyriaCmpgn/status/763447153943539712 https://twitter.com/MahmoudRashwani/status/763459693327056896 https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/763454656253194240 https://twitter.com/MahmoudRashwani/status/763459509796925440 https://twitter.com/JakeGodin/status/763487670848872448 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/syria-civil-war-suspected-chemical-attack-aleppo-160811051215993.html https://youtu.be/4bHvZBVuTSI http://hisz.rsoe.hu/alertmap/database/?pageid=event_desc&edis_id=CR-20160811-54522-SYR http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-gas-idUSKCN10L2QW http://news.sky.com/story/syria-suspected-chlorine-gas-attack-in-aleppo-10531446 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN10M16M https://twitter.com/OrientNewsEn/status/763718839033073664 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37049555, http://news.sky.com/story/aleppo-boris-johnson-deeply-concerned-despite-new-ceasefire-hope-10531446, https://www.bellingcat.com/uncategorized/2016/08/13/reports-of-chlorine-gas-that-targeted-civilians-in-aleppo/
43.	12 August	Hraytan	Aleppo	http://www.lcc-sy.com/2016/08/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%88%D8%A2%D8%AE%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%A7/, https://www.facebook.com/LCCSy/
44.	16 August	Marea	Aleppo	https://www.alsouria.net/content/%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=515908775279777&id=100005819765677 http://aranews.org/2016/08/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA/ http://iran-daily.com/News/167011.html http://yournewswire.com/isis-carries-out-chemical-attack-on-residential-areas-in-syria/ https://twitter.com/LindaHemby/status/765860929913270272 https://twitter.com/middleeastwars/status/765571675052179456 https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/765583644635303936 https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567282-isis-strikes-fsa-held-town-with-toxic-gas-activists https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/765612884223201280 http://video.news.com.au/v/495281/SYRIA-Workers-Remove-Alleged-Chemical-Munitions-Following-Islamic-State-Attack-in-Marea-August-16
45.	16 August	Aleppo city	Aleppo	http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/08/16/480341/Daesh-chemical-attack-Syria-Aleppo
46.	20 August	Hasakah city	Hasakah	https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/767286118039642112
47.	25 August	Dandaniyah, nr Manbij	Aleppo	http://hisz.rsoe.hu/alertmap/database/?pageid=event_summary&edis_id=CR-20160826-54736-SYR, https://twitter.com/Mexlumy/status/768907938714955776, https://twitter.com/Dikrambalekani/status/768895819026165760, https://twitter.com/kurdistannews24/status/769088319133216769, https://twitter.com/todayinsyria/status/769088528970051584, https://twitter.com/kurdistannews24/status/769089800209129472, http://en.hawarnews.com/akp-gangs-use-chemical-gas-in-dendeniye-village/, https://southfront.org/turkish-led-forces-use-chemical-weapons-against-sdf-northwest-of-manbij/, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/25-august-kurdish-videos-show-people-with-chemical-burns, https://twitter.com/mutludc/status/768896445747462144, http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/25082016, https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/anha-turkish-forces-use-chemical-weapons-manbij/, http://en.hawarnews.com/turkish-army-commits-a-massacre-in-manbij-civilians-slain/

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
48.	28 August	Qabr al Englizi/Qabr al Inglizi	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/ZaitonMagazine/status/770144842697637888, https://twitter.com/sorya33_gehadk/status/770043703473926144, https://twitter.com/jisrtv/status/770033192946524160, https://twitter.com/jisrtv/status/770014498786869248, https://twitter.com/ALAMAW1/status/769951855631798274, https://twitter.com/syrialive54/status/769939532938612736, https://twitter.com/allsory_allhor/status/769926316418367488
49.	5 September	Marea	Aleppo	http://www.shaam.org/reports/battleground-reports/الحصيلة-اليومية-للأحداث-حصيلة-04-09-2016, html, http://aranews.org/2016/09/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7/
50.	6 September	Al Sukari	Aleppo	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37292143, http://linkis.com/com/UXUur, http://english.aawsat.com/2016/09/article55357878/rescue-workers-report-suspected-aleppo-chlorine-attack-choking-dozens, https://twitter.com/Ghada12180130/status/773447348752121857 (Video), https://twitter.com/doammuslims/status/773163705710342144, https://twitter.com/doammuslims/status/773150952652148736, https://twitter.com/NorthernStork/status/773121403784683520, https://twitter.com/IranArabSpring/status/773038679728201728, https://twitter.com/FSAPlatform/status/7734063155405127 69, https://twitter.com/AimanofArabia/status/773197357861179392, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBJg67hNK3c, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/syria-war-chlorine-gas-dropped-rebel-held-aleppo-160906153118935.html, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/syrian-government-chlorine-gas-aleppo, https://yall.souriya.wordpress.com/2016/09/06/syriaaleppoattack-with-chlorine-on-sukkari-neighborhood/, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/29-july-reports-of-a-new-regime-chlorine-gas-attack-on-aleppos, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160907-footage-shows-aftermath-of-brutal-chlorine-gas-attack-in-sukari-aleppo/, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aleppo-idUSKCN11C1S5?il=0, http://elbashayeronline.com/news-702393.html http://radar2.net/External-275512.html http://www.qasioun.net/ar/news/show/36453/%D8%B6%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%8

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				A%D8%A7_%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A_%D8%AD%D9%8A_%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1_%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9, http://www.thedailystar.net/world/middle-east/dozens-choke-aleppo-1282033, http://www.voanews.com/a/rescue-workers-report-chlorine-attack-on-aleppo/3496835.html, http://www.inforum.com/news/4109042-suspected-chlorine-attack-chokes-dozens-syria-rescue-workers-say
51	6 September	Tarma/Ghouta	Damascus	http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016-7-september-reports-of-a-new-chemical-attack-in-ein-tarma, https://twitter.com/DannyNis/status/773358709468725248, https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/773287216202252288, https://twitter.com/salahshoork/status/773494891468816384, https://twitter.com/anadoluagency/status/773473551986880512, https://twitter.com/monaalami/status/773428694648053761, https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/773287216202252288, https://twitter.com/Navsteva/status/773265789210222592, http://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/assad-forces-drop-chlorine-gas-in-damascus-syria-2526863, http://www.worldbulletin.net/middle-east/177124/regime-forces-drop-chlorine-gas-in-damascus
52	16 September	Umm Hawsh / Um Hosh / Maarsad um Hawsh	Aleppo	http://aranews.net/2016/09/islamic-state-extremists-launch-chemical-attack-kurdish-villages-northwest-syria/, http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/siria/288237/armas-quimicas-isis-ataque-alepo, http://www.presstv.ir/DetailFa/2016/09/17/485100/Syria-Aleppo-Daesh-chemical-attack-Harbal-Um-Hosh-SDF-Afrin, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wNAAIRH0A8, http://alwaght.com/en/News/67839/ISIS-Chemical-Attack-on-Aleppo, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMdwzxJUz2A, https://zindinews.com/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/, http://alwaght.com/fa/News/67876/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF, http://xeber24.org/144229.html, http://www.alchourouk.com/201281/675/1/%C2%AB%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4%C2%BB-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8--%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9.html
53.	28 September	Karah	Hama	https://www.google.it/maps/place/%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%8C+%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%E2%80%AD/@35.3442308,36.8382937,15.17z/data=!4m13!1m7!3m6!1s0x0:0x0!2zMzXCsDIwJzE2LjAiTiAzNsKwNDknNTMuMCJF!3b1!8m2!3d35.3377778!4d36.8313889!3m4!1s0x152493b62a30a16d:0xf741ee79ee510865!8m2!3d35.3430409!4d36.8344465
54.	1 October	Locale of Kafr Zita	Hama	http://sinnews.co/?p=50510, https://youtu.be/e85s0DXYGVs, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kbs0bNNVEnw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0L-nlkvQe0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xRG1qHuFNqI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5k4vsBDfd0 https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/782541734073040896 https://twitter.com/DannyNis/status/782269835346636801 https://twitter.com/DannyNis/status/782287202650820608 https://twitter.com/baladinetwork/status/782286379116101636 https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/782541734073040896 https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/782586004322586624 http://baladi-news.com/en/news/details/10929/Dozens_of_cases_of_suffocation_with_Toxic_gas_in_Hama, https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1086000994782484&id=593027507413171, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/10/13/examining-chlorine-attack-kafarzita-hama-october-1st-2016/
55.	3 October	Kafarya and Al Fu'ah Villages	Idlib	http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/10/03/terrorists-launch-chemical-attack-syrias-kefraya-foua/, https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20161003/1045956622/attack-syria-chemicals.html, https://www.facebook.com/SyrianWarNewsInfoMedia/posts/916824435090165 http://veterans.linkedlocalnetwork.net/2016/10/us-backed-terrorists-gas-syrian-civilians-again/, http://www.veteranstoday.com/2016/10/03/us/, http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/10/03/terrorists-launch-chemical-attack-syrias-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				kefraya-foua/, http://veterans.dfns.net/2016/10/03/us/, https://www.google.it/maps/place/Kafarya,+Syria/@35.9890135,36.6677284,15z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x15250be0d6a4561d:0x2f57fa6d7333dc9d!8m2!3d35.990733!4d36.6791536?hl=en> and al-Fu'ah<https://www.google.it/maps/place/Al+Fu'ah,+Syria/@35.982918,36.6853235,14z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x15250c044c28668f:0xe0b05d6a080aff65!8m2!3d35.9819344!4d36.7058202?hl=en> in northern Idleb province with shells containing Chlorine, https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20161003/1045956622/attack-syria-chemicals.html?
56.	6 October	Umm Hawsh / Um Hosh / Maarsad um Hawsh	Aleppo	http://www.iraqinews.com/arab-world-news/isis-shells-sdf-headquarters-chemical-weapons/ http://basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/303228
57.	17 October	Ltamenah	Hama	https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/787925883311034369, http://aranews.org/2016/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AD/, https://twitter.com/GerV29/status/788031233582325760,
58.	30 October	3000 Apartments project, Hamadaniyah, al-assad, 1070 Apartments project	Aleppo	https://www.rt.com/news/364737-syria-aleppo-poison-gas/, http://sana.sy/en/?p=92011, https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/792704168406478848, https://twitter.com/LegitCFCPundit/status/792676878968557568, https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20161030l046887398-aleppo-chemical-weapons/, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVIcSSTrFrA&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DpVIcSSTrFrA&has_verified=1, http://www.news24.com/World/News/syria-state-media-says-rebels-fire-toxic-gas-in-aleppo-20161030, https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/792714143421857792, http://www.pravdareport.com/news/hotspots/terror/31-10-2016/136023-chemical_weapons_aleppo-0/, http://presstv.com/Detail/2016/10/30/491366/Militants-chemical-attack-residential-areas-Dahiyet-alAssad-Hamdaniyeh-Aleppo-Takfiri-militants, http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/10/9169/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8.html, http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/1545260 http://sabanews.net/ar/news445354.htm https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/792714143421857792 https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/792695824182640640, https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/793096013686906880, http://www.pravdareport.com/video/01-11-2016/136035-syria-0/, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmUalOkgKI0, https://twitter.com/raging545/status/792313430355087360 (29th....?),
59.	31 October	Rashidin	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/EA_WorldView/status/793034384177848320, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-october-proassad-forces-shelled-again-aleppos-alrashedeen, http://eaworldview.com/2016/10/syria-daily-pro-assad-forces-try-to-hold-back-rebel-offensive-aleppo/#chlorine, https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/793187082030223360, https://twitter.com/Omar_Madaniah/status/793037421101318144, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/10/31/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9,
60.	2 November	Khan Al Assal & Kafr Naha	Aleppo	http://www.lcc-sy.com/2016/11/%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-9-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8/, http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/3-november-suspected-chlorine-attacks-in-aleppo-western-countryside, https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/794153697714573312, http://www.qasioun.net/ar/news/show/41264/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A_%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A_%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%%

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84_%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%8A_%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1_%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89_%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81_%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8,
61.	3 November	New Aleppo Region	Aleppo	https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611031047034560-aleppo-poisonous-gas/, https://twitter.com/A_Ozkok/status/794150563214741505, http://sana.sy/?p=454267, http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/45340/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A4%D9%87-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%AE%D9%85-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8, http://sana.sy/en/?p=93460,
62.	7 November	Khan Al Assal	Aleppo	https://twitter.com/AhmadAlkhtiib/status/795565114917343232, https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/795523772371632129, https://twitter.com/MostafaMe4/status/795896863853527040, https://twitter.com/22_jussy/status/795818975938674688, https://www.facebook.com/fares.elryeeh/posts/1137188853033436, https://twitter.com/RevolutionSyria/status/795796449992667142, http://eaworldview.com/2016/11/syria-daily-kurdish-led-forces-declares-offensive-to-take-isis-held-raqqa/#deaths, http://baladi-news.com/en/news/details/12352/Assad&39;s_regime_targets_Khan_al_Assal_in_Aleppo_with_toxic_#chlorine, https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/syria-news-briefattacks-with-chlorine-on-khan-asal-in-aleppo-and-with-napalm-on-douma-in-damascus-suburbs/,
63.	13 November	Nayrab (near airport)	Aleppo	https://arabic.rt.com/news/849500-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1/, https://twitter.com/leithfadel/status/797958628628111360, https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611131047393027-aleppo-gas-attack/, http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/46171/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A, https://topnews-nasserkandil.com/final/Full_News.php?id=66141, https://www.rt.com/news/366799-aleppo-chemical-weapons-attack/#.WCmrn39sVKo.twitter, https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/798113997572685824, https://southfront.org/militants-used-toxic-gas-near-aleppo-airport-report/, https://www.facebook.com/dimashq.now/,
64.	18 November	Hanano	Aleppo	http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/18-november-airstrikes-with-chlorine-gas-on-hanano-neigborhood, http://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/114373, http://www.baladi-news.com/ar/news/details/12760/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF_%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81_%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8_%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9_%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D8%AE, https://twitter.com/raging545/status/800452742665895936https://twitter.com/Rami_Zien/status/799528835091988480%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82_%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86, https://twitter.com/EatingMyPeaz/status/799545258078072832, https://twitter.com/Rami_Zien/status/799528835091988480, https://twitter.com/JfshamJf/status/799522415571333120, https://twitter.com/raging545/status/800452742665895936 (video)
65.	18/19 November	Ard Al Hamra / Al Sakhour	Aleppo	http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/20-november-graphic-video-family-of-six-including-4-children, http://www.krcrtv.com/news/eastern-aleppo-blitz-kills-almost-300-in-5-days/174736597, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/20/middleeast/syria-aleppo-airstrikes/, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN13F0HS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38043157, http://www.qasioun.net/en/news/show/42872/Chlorine_Over_Sakhour_%E2%80%A6_Regime_Willing_To_Advance_In_Sheikh_Najjar,_Aleppo,

	Date	Approximate location	Governorate	Links
				https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/800671804230483968, http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/894014/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1, http://www.elghad.co/world/news-81545, http://www.akhbaralaan.net/news/arab-world/2016/11/20/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/11/20/%D8%B6%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-

United Nations S/2017/46

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 January 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 19 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Ms. Isobel Coleman has been appointed alternate representative of the United States on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-00674 (E) 170117

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/47

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 January 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 17 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you in reference to the summary statement by the Secretary-General dated 3 January 2017 of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration (S/2017/10).

In this connection, I have the honour to inform you that, upon the instructions of my Government, Tunisia requests the retention of the following items, listed in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned document, on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized:

63. Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council;

64. Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed Khaled **Khiari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-00729 (E) 190117

Please recycle

United Nations A/71/751–S/2017/48

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
19 January 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 30 December 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government I am transmitting herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, dated 29 December 2016, on the diversionary incursion attempt by Azerbaijan into the State border with Armenia, which resulted in the loss of lives (see annex).

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tigran **Samvelian**
Charge d'affaires a.i.

17-00854 (E) 230117

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 December 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia

29 December 2016

We condemn in the strongest terms today's diversionary incursion attempt by Azerbaijan into the State border with Armenia, which resulted in the loss of lives. We express our deepest condolences to the relatives and fellow servicemen of the fallen soldiers.

While the most serious damage caused to the settlement process as a result of the Azerbaijani aggression against Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) in April 2016 has not yet been overcome, Baku is embarking on a new adventurism grossly violating the agreements reached at the Vienna and Saint Petersburg summits and the commitment to settle the issue through peaceful means. This is how Baku responds to the Foreign Ministers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group Co-Chair countries who urged, in Hamburg, strict adherence to the 1994 and 1995 ceasefire agreements.

On numerous occasions, the international community, through the Co-Chairs, has called to maintain the ceasefire, especially during the holidays. By undertaking military diversionary incursions on Christmas and New Year's Eve, Baku is acting against universal human values.

The international community, first and foremost the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, should take immediate steps to sober up the Azerbaijani leadership, who has lost the sense of reality and who ignores and opposes with defiance their calls and demands.

United Nations S/2017/49

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 17 January 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 16 July 2016 to 15 January 2017.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sebastiano **Cardi**
Security Council Facilitator for the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

17-00275 (E) 180117

Please recycle

Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) set forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.

2. In the note, it was established that the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its facilitator for the functions specified therein. On 16 January 2016, the Permanent Representative of Spain, Román Oyarzun Marchesi, was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2016 (see S/2016/2/Rev.4). On 3 January 2017, I was appointed as Facilitator for the period ending 31 December 2017 (see S/2017/2/Rev.1).

3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on his or her work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.

4. On 18 July 2016, the Security Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs on the first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/589), by the Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/649) and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (see S/PV.7739).

5. The present report covers the period from 16 July 2016 to 15 January 2017.

II. "2231 format" of the Security Council

6. The representatives of the "2231 format" of the Security Council held an informal meeting on 13 January 2017 to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to review, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the findings and recommendations contained in the second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution before its public release.

7. On 21 September 2016, the Facilitator's team, together with the Secretariat, met representatives of the Joint Commission to discuss the functioning of the procurement channel. That meeting was further proof of the fluid cooperation between the Security Council and the Joint Commission and gave continuity to similar meetings held in the past.

8. There were no changes to the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which, at present, includes 23 individuals and 61 entities.[1]

9. The Facilitator continued to have the support of the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs.

III. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

10. On 16 January 2016, upon the submission by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council of a report confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (S/2016/57, annex), all provisions of Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) were terminated.

11. On the same day, all the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) entered into force, requiring compliance with paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the provisions in paragraphs 6 (a) to (f) of annex B to the resolution for the duration specified therein, and calling for compliance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of annex B to the resolution.

12. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), the IAEA Director General submitted, in September and November 2016, to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/808 and S/2016/983). In his introductory statement to the meeting of the Board of Governors held on 17 November 2016, the Director General called attention to his report that the Agency continued to verify and monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In addition, on 6 December, IAEA submitted an update on developments in relation to the Iranian stockpile of heavy water since its last quarterly report.

13. In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran: has not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 reactor) on the basis of its original design; has no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges that have remained installed in 30 cascades at Natanz and has not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235; has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at Fordow, and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant; has continued to permit the Agency to

[1] The list includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined in resolution 2231 (2015). On 17 January 2016, the Council decided to delist one entity, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (see Council press release dated 17 January 2016, entitled "Security Council removes Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International from 2231 list").

use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals that communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1); and has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for the Islamic Republic of Iran as requested by the Agency and provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran (para. 67.2). Both reports also affirm the continued cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the monitoring of uranium ore concentrate in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as specified by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

14. The Agency also reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. The Agency further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and that the Agency continues its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to sites and other locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

IV. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

15. The Facilitator received no information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). At the same time, the Facilitator took note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/987) and the letter from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/992).

16. The Facilitator had contacts with the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations to seek a response to two alleged instances of arms transfers:

(a) On 7 June 2016, the Security Council received a report on the implementation of paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2016/649, para. 23). A Member State informed the Council that its naval forces had encountered and boarded a dhow transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman with arms that had allegedly originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and were likely bound for Yemen. On 17 June, the Facilitator sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (see S/2016/649, para. 24) inviting his Government to comment on the report;

(b) On 5 July 2016, the Council received another report on the implementation of paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). A Member State informed the Council that its naval forces had encountered and boarded a ship in the northern Indian Ocean with arms that had allegedly originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and were likely bound for Yemen or Somalia (see S/2016/649, para. 25). On 22 July, the Facilitator sent a second letter to the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran inviting his Government to comment on the report.

17. During the contacts of the Facilitator to seek clarification about these two alleged instances, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the allegations, reiterating that the Islamic Republic of Iran had never engaged in such deliveries. As at the time of submission of the present report, the Islamic Republic of Iran had not formally replied to the letters of 17 June 2016 and 22 July 2016.

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

18. The procurement channel processed five proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) that had been submitted by two Member States to the Security Council for approval. In accordance with paragraph 8 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the proposals were immediately forwarded to the Joint Commission for its review.

19. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council on 6 October 2016. The Joint Commission provided recommendations of approval. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council on 17 November. One proposal for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 was submitted to the Council on 15 November. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval. The proposal was approved by the Council on 28 December. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Council on 6 December. These proposals are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

20. On 23 December 2016, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2016/1113), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reflecting the activities performed during the said six-month reporting period.

21. In addition, one notification was submitted to the Security Council on 17 November 2016 in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technology covered in B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 intended for light water reactors. Second and third notifications were submitted to the Council on 23 and 28 December 2016, respectively, in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements intended for light water reactors, and of equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 intended for light water reactors. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

VI. Other approval and exemption requests

22. On 23 November 2016, a proposal to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) was submitted by a Member State to the Security Council. The Council has not yet replied to this proposal.

23. Exemptions to the asset freeze provisions and to the travel ban provisions are contained in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e), respectively, of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

VII. Transparency, guidance and outreach

24. Transparency, practical guidance and outreach remained a priority, in view of the importance of a proper understanding of resolution 2231 (2015) for its implementation.

25. The website on resolution 2231 (2015), managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat, has been a key instrument for providing relevant information about the implementation of the resolution. From 18 July to 20 December 2016, the number of page views was more than 72,000, for a total of more than 140,000 since the creation of the website.

26. On 25 July 2016, the Security Council responded to a request for guidance submitted by a Member State on 24 June regarding access to foreign ports by Iranian-flagged vessels in order to load and unload goods. The Council recalled that all the provisions of previous resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue had been terminated on 16 January, in line with paragraph 7 (a) of resolution 2231 (2015), including the ban on the provision of bunkering services to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, believed to carry prohibited items. The Council also recalled that none of the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) prevented Iranian-flagged vessels and Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, from entering foreign ports in order to load and unload goods. The Council further recalled the provisions in paragraphs 6 and 7 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) relating to items on States' territories, including seaports and airports, the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is not in compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or resolution 2231 (2015).

27. On 19 September 2016, in response to a request submitted by a Member State through the Facilitator, the Joint Commission provided guidance on temporary nuclear-related transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The Joint Commission indicated that in cases where the goods in question are intended to remain in the Islamic Republic of Iran only for a certain period of time and subsequently leave the Islamic Republic of Iran would follow the established procedure within the procurement channel, including an end-use certification signed by the designated Iranian national authority. The Joint Commission also indicated that it would endeavour to expedite its review of temporary exports for demonstration or display in exhibitions. The guidance was

reflected in amended versions of the documents offering practical information on the procurement channel, which are available on the Security Council website dedicated to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and were brought to the attention of all Member States through a note verbale issued by the Facilitator on 18 October 2016 (SCA/4/16 (10)).

28. On 27 December 2016, the Facilitator received a report on the steps taken by one Member State to bring its national legal framework into compliance with resolution 2231 (2015).

29. The Facilitator held several bilateral consultations with Member State representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

United Nations S/2017/50

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2017
English
Original: French

Letter dated 17 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the joint declaration adopted by the participants of the conference on peace in the Middle East, held in Paris on 15 January 2017. Representatives from over 70 countries and international organizations attended the conference in order to reaffirm their support for a just, lasting and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see annex). The participants reaffirmed that the only way to achieve lasting peace is through a negotiated solution with two States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**

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Annex to the letter dated 17 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

Joint declaration of the international conference on peace in the Middle East

Following the ministerial meeting held in Paris on 3 June 2016, the participants met in Paris on 15 January 2017 to reaffirm their support for a just, lasting and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They reaffirmed that a negotiated solution with two States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, is the only way to achieve enduring peace.

They emphasized the importance for the parties to restate their commitment to this solution, to take urgent steps in order to reverse the current negative trends on the ground, including continued acts of violence and ongoing settlement activity, and to start meaningful direct negotiations.

They reiterated that a negotiated two-State solution should meet the legitimate aspirations of both sides, including the Palestinians' right to statehood and sovereignty, fully end the occupation that began in 1967, satisfy Israel's security needs and resolve all permanent status issues on the basis of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and they also recalled other relevant Security Council resolutions.

They underscored the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 as a comprehensive framework for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus contributing to regional peace and security.

They welcomed international efforts to advance Middle East peace, including the adoption of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) on 23 December 2016, in which the Council clearly condemned settlement activity, incitement to and all acts of violence and terror, and called upon both sides to take steps to advance the two-State solution on the ground; the recommendations of the Quartet on 1 July 2016; and the United States Secretary of State's principles on the two-State solution on 28 December 2016.

They noted the importance of addressing the dire humanitarian and security situation in the Gaza Strip and called for swift steps to improve the situation.

They emphasized the importance for Israelis and Palestinians to comply with international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.

The participants highlighted the potential for security, stability and prosperity for both parties that could result from a peace agreement. They expressed their readiness to exert necessary efforts towards the achievement of the two-State solution and to contribute substantially to arrangements for ensuring the sustainability of a negotiated peace agreement, in particular in the areas of political and economic incentives, the consolidation of Palestinian state capacities, and civil society dialogue. Those could include:

- A European special privileged partnership; other political and economic incentives and increased private sector involvement; support to further efforts by the parties to improve economic cooperation; continued financial support to the Palestinian Authority in building the infrastructure for a viable Palestinian economy.

- Supporting and strengthening steps taken by Palestinians to exercise their responsibilities of statehood through consolidating their institutions and institutional capacities, including for service delivery.

- Convening Israeli and Palestinian civil society forums, in order to enhance dialogue between the parties, rekindle the public debate and strengthen the role of civil society on both sides.

Looking ahead, the participants:

- Call upon both sides to officially restate their commitment to the two-State solution, thus disassociating themselves from voices that reject this solution.

- Call upon each side to independently demonstrate, through policies and actions, a genuine commitment to the two-State solution and refrain from unilateral steps that prejudge the outcome of negotiations on final status issues, including on Jerusalem, borders, security and refugees, and that they will not recognize.

- Welcome the prospect of closer cooperation between the Quartet and Arab League members and other relevant actors to further the objectives of this declaration.

As follow-up to the conference, interested participants, expressing their readiness to review progress, resolved to meet again before the end of the year in order to support both sides in advancing the two-State solution through negotiations.

France will inform the parties about the international community's collective support and concrete contribution to the two-State solution contained in this joint declaration.

United Nations S/2017/51

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 18 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), contained in document S/2016/1136, as follows:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms its principled position, including its certain reservations, with respect to the involvement of the Security Council in Iran's nuclear programme as reflected in the annex to document S/2015/550.

2. The second report continues to disregard the letter and spirit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and even contradicts resolution 2231 (2015) for the reasons elaborated in my letter dated 17 July 2016 (S/2016/626). This report indicates that the Secretariat is distancing itself from the expressed intent of the Security Council to make a fundamental shift in its consideration of Iran's nuclear issue by persisting in the old biased attitude against Iran.

3. Misinterpretation of the mandate given by the Security Council through the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), once again, has led to a report exclusively focused on annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), except for paragraph 13 of the report, which elaborates on the fulfilment of Iran's JCPOA nuclear-related commitments. The first sentence of paragraph 2 of the report states, "In the same resolution, the Security Council requested that I submit a report on the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) every six months." This statement reflects an incorrect understanding of the source and scope of the mandate that the Secretariat received from the Council. The note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), in its paragraph 7, mandated the Secretary-General to "report to the Security Council every six months on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)", which consists of its main text plus its annexes A and B. Accordingly, the report of the Secretary-General should cover the resolution in its entirety, including its annex A, containing the JCPOA. No report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) could be considered complete and balanced in the absence of reporting on its annex A. The proposal by six individual countries in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), proposing that "the Security Council ask the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of these provisions every six months", could not be considered a

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mandate for the Secretary-General's report. We urge the Secretariat to respect its reporting mandate, as clearly set forth in paragraph 7 of the note by the President of the Council (S/2016/44).

4. The Secretariat, in paragraph 7 of the report, sought the opportunity to examine the seized weapons "in order to corroborate the information provided and independently ascertain the origin of the shipments". A similar line is repeated in paragraph 29. It implies that the Secretariat assumes itself to be entitled to investigate and draw conclusions on alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution. There is no basis for such an assumption in the note by the President of the Security Council, and the Secretariat's offer goes far beyond its mandate and its expertise. As a reminder, all relevant subsidiary bodies established pursuant to Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) dissolved when those resolutions were terminated on the Implementation Day of the JCPOA, and no replacements were established. Any attempt, direct or indirect, to re-establish identical entities or revive revoked functions is contrary to the text and context of resolution 2231 (2015). In the same vein, the Secretariat, surprisingly, makes references to the aforementioned terminated resolutions in footnote 3.

5. The second sentence of paragraph 17 is not consistent with the text of the decision reached by the JCPOA Joint Commission on transferring procedures. Moreover, paragraphs 9 and 19 of the report do not conform to the exact terms of the resolution. Such inconsistency might be misleading.

6. It is not acceptable that the Secretariat includes a detailed account of unsubstantiated information and false allegations in the report. I request that you put in place clear measures and procedures to avoid the inclusion of unauthenticated information with a view to thwarting attempts by certain countries to advance their biased political agenda, which does not help the smooth implementation of the JCPOA.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/52

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 January 2017

Original: English

Identical letters dated 18 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to inform you of an alarming increase in the volume of attempts to smuggle prohibited goods into the Gaza Strip. In 2016, Israeli security forces thwarted 1,226 such attempts, which constitute a 165 per cent increase in comparison with 2015.

The prohibited goods which were confiscated included drones, small unmanned aerial vehicles, lasers and military uniforms. Such materials are used by terror organizations in Gaza to enhance their terror capabilities.

This worrisome trend is taking place while Israel is making significant efforts to enhance the quality of life of the citizens of Gaza, despite the evident security risks that follow. In 2016, the Government of Israel facilitated a 13 per cent increase in the amount of Israeli goods crossing into the Gaza Strip in comparison with 2015. This resulted in a total of 175,000 trucks, including a monthly high of 890 trucks per day in the month of October.

Unfortunately, this increase that Israel has facilitated is being abused by terror organizations attempting to smuggle prohibited materials into Gaza.

The illicit weapon and dual-use material smuggling activity perpetrated by terror organizations not only poses a danger to Israel's civilian population, but also hinders the ability of humanitarian assistance organizations operating in Gaza to work effectively. By doing so, these terror organizations are, first and foremost, harming the people of Gaza.

As Israel has reiterated many times before, the internationally designated terror organization Hamas consistently diverts and confiscates resources dedicated to the humanitarian development needs of Gaza residents, and repurposes them to their military objectives — digging terror tunnels, constructing training camps and manufacturing rockets.

The Secretary-General, António Guterres, emphasized in his speech at the Security Council's open debate on 10 January 2017 the importance of conflict prevention. Preventing Hamas and other terror organizations from rebuilding their military infrastructure — stockpiling weapons and rebuilding their system of terror tunnels — should be the first step taken in order to prevent further suffering among both Israelis and Palestinians.

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I call on the Security Council to condemn Hamas and other terror organizations for their reprehensible smuggling activity.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative